The current times call for reforms in educational processes. The Covid-19 pandemic had an unforeseen impact on the educational system in all countries. This need for change requires new pedagogies and new methods for teaching and learning. Understanding the need for change is essential for the formulation of adaptive proposals, as well as for the generation of training activities to complement the teaching curriculum. New educational practices lead to a vision of educational quality, with new approaches that allow the continuous (...) integration of knowledge and permanent interaction with the student. This paper presents an analysis of the new teaching methodologies in times of confinement due to the pandemic caused by Covid-19. Keywords: Teaching methodologies, educational system, learning process. References [1]É. Tremblay-Wragg, C. Raby, L. Ménard y I. Plante, «El uso de estrategias didácticas diversificadas por cuatro profesores universitarios: ¿qué contribución a la motivación de aprendizaje de sus alumnos?,» Docencia en educación superior, vol. 26, nº 21, 2021. [2]L. Czerniewicz, R. Mogliacci, S. Walji, A. Cliff, B. Swinnerton y N. Morris, «Enseñanza y aprendizaje académico en el nexo: desagregación, mercantilización y digitalización en la educación superior,» Teaching in Higher Education, vol. 26, nº 2021, p. 16, 2021. [3]S. Dogan y A. Adam, «Aumentar el efecto del desarrollo profesional en la instrucción efectiva a través de comunidades profesionales,» Docentes y docencia: teoría y práctica, vol. 26, nº 3-4, pp. 326-349, 2020. [4]I. M. Torres Salas, «La enseñanza tradicional de las ciencias versus las nuevas tendencias educativas,» Educare, vol. 14, nº 1, pp. 131-142, 2010. [5]B. Fabio, J. Antonio Palomino y J. González Henríquez, «Evaluación y contraste de los métodos de enseñanza tradicional y lúdico,» Revista de Educación física y deportes, vol. 13, nº 94, pp. 29-36, 2008. [6]Y. Benítez y C. Mora, «Enseñanza tradicional vs aprendizaje activo,» Revista Cubana de Física, vol. 27, nº 2A, pp. 175-179, 2010. [7]P. Morales Bueno y V. Landa Fitzgerald, «Aprendizaje basado en problemas,» Theoria, vol. 13, nº 1, pp. 145-157, 2004. [8]R. Gil-Galván, I. Martín-Espinosa y F. Gil-Galván, «University student perceptions of competences acquired through problem-based learning,» Educación XXI, vol. 24, nº 1, pp. 271-295, 2020. [9]E. Ortiz Cermeño, «El aprendizaje basado en problemas,» Perfiles Educativos, vol. 41, nº 164, pp. 208-213, 2019. [10]E. Araos-Baeriswyl, C. Moll-Manzur, Á. Paredes y J. Landeros, «Aprendizaje invertido: un enfoque pedagógico en tiempos de pandemia,» Rev. Atención Primaria, vol. 53, nº 1, p. 117, 2021. [11]V. León-Carrascosa, M. Belando-Montoro y S. Sánchez-Serrano, «Design and validation of a questionnaire to evaluate the service-learning methodology,» Rev.Estudios sobre educación, vol. 39, nº 1, pp. 247-266, 2020. [12]J. Collado-Ruano, M. Ojeda, M. Malo y D. Amino, «Educación, arte e interculturalidad: El cine documental como lenguaje comunicativo y tecnología innovadora para el aprendizaje de la metodología I + D + I,» Rev. Texto livre, vol. 13, nº 3, pp. 376-393, 2020. [13]P. M. Bueno y V. Landa Fitzgerald, «Aprendizaje basado en problemas,» Theoria, vol. 13, nº 1, pp. 145-157, 2004. [14]J. A. Martí, M. Heydrich, M. Rojas y A. Hernández, «Aprendizaje basado en proyectos: Una experiencia de innovación docente,» Universidad EAFIT, vol. 46, nº 158, pp. 11-21, 2010. [15]L. Rojas y N. M. Jaimes, «Canvas LMS y el trabajo colaborativo como metodología de aprendizaje en entornos virtuales,» de Congreso Ibérico de Sistemas y Tecnologías de la Información, CISTI, Bogotá, Colombia, 2020. [16]B. Bordel y P. Mareca, «Results and Trends in educational MOOCs in the engineering area with MIRIADAX platform. A case study,» de 15th Iberian Conference on Information Systems and Technologies, CISTI 2020; Seville; Sevilla, España, 2020. [17]K. Vermeir y G. Kelchtermans, «Innovative practice as interpretative negotiation.A case-study on the kamishibai in Kindergarten.,» Teachers and Teaching: Theory and Practice, vol. 26, nº 3-4, pp. 248-263, 2020. [18]B. Tucker, «The Flipped Classroom: Online instruction at home frees class time for learning,» Education Next, vol. 1, nº 1, pp. 82-84, 2012. [19]M. V. Ledo, N. R. Michelena, N. N. Cao, I. d. R. M. Suárez y M. N. Vialart Vidal, « Aula invertida, nueva estrategia didáctica,» Educación Médica Superior, vol. 30, nº 3, pp. 678-688, 2016. [20]Metodologías activas por medio de las TIC, [Online]. Available: https://www.campuseducacion.com/blog/recursos/articulos-campuseducacion metodologias-activas-por-medio-de-las-tic/?cn-reloaded=1. [Last access: February 14, 2021]. (shrink)

Tome I : 2. L'introduction fondamentale -- tome II. [No special title].

Orthodoxy holds that the difference between weakness of will and compulsion is a matter of the resistibility of an agent's effective motivation, which makes control-based views of agency especially well equipped to distinguish blameworthy weak-willed acts from non-blameworthy compulsive acts. I defend an alternative view that the difference between weakness and compulsion instead lies in the fact that agents would upon reflection give some conative weight to acting on their weak-willed desires for some aim other than to extinguish them, but (...) not to their compulsive desires. This view allows identificationist theorists of moral responsibility to explain why weak-willed actions, but not compulsive actions, are attributable to agents such that they can, in theory, be praised or blamed for them. After motivating and presenting the view in detail, I show how it has unique resources for explaining the ethics of managing one's compulsions. (shrink)

This article investigates the causal efficacy of social properties, which faces the following puzzle. First, for both intuitive and scientific reasons, it seems social properties have causal import. But, second, social properties are also characteristically extrinsic: to have some social property depends, in typical cases, on what one’s society is like around them. And, third, there is good reason to doubt that extrinsic properties make a genuine causal contribution. After elaborating on these three claims, I defend the following resolution to (...) the puzzle: social causation occurs at the level at which social properties are intrinsic. (shrink)

How do groups of people persist through time? Groups can change their members, locations, and structure. In this paper, I present puzzles of persistence applied to social groups. I first argue that four-dimensional theories better explain the context sensitivity of how groups persist. I then exploit two unique features of the social to argue for the stage theory of group persistence in particular. First, fusion and fission cases actually happen to social groups, and so cannot be marginalized as “pathological.” Second, (...) it is implausible that groups spatially coincide pre-fission. This means that theories that depend on pre-fission spatial coincidence, such as some endurance theories and the worm theory, cannot explain fission cases. All things considered, the stage theory offers the best explanation of how groups persist. (shrink)

CHAPTER I THE INTELLECTUAL CHARACTER OF POSITIVISM The object of The object of all true Philosophy is Philosophy is to frame a system which shall compre- to ...

Much of the literature on impairment to self-governance focuses on cases in which a person either lacks the ability to protect herself from errant urges or cases in which a person lacks the capacity to initiate self-reflective agential processes. This has led to frameworks for thinking about self-governance designed with only the possibility of these sorts of impairments in mind. I challenge this orthodoxy using the case of melancholic depression to show that there is a third way that self-governance can (...) be undermined: an agent may fail to form the desire she most wants to act on. (shrink)

In this chapter I argue that choosing to live forever comes with the threat of an especially pernicious kind of boredom. However, it may be theoretically possible to circumvent it by finding ways to pursue an infinite number of projects consistent with one’s personality, taking on endlessly pursuable endlessly interesting projects, or by rekindling old projects once you’ve forgotten about them. However, each of these possibilities is contingent upon having certain traits that you are likely not currently in a good (...) position to assess. I therefore argue that no one is in a good position to be confident about her prospects for living forever. (shrink)

I THE NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY In order to explain properly the true nature and peculiar character of the positive philosophy, ...

Deep Self views of moral responsibility have been criticized for positing mysterious concepts, making nearly paradoxical claims about the ownership of one’s mental states, and promoting self-deceptive moral evasion. I defend Deep Self views from these pervasive forms of skepticism by arguing that some criticism is hasty and stems from epistemic injustice regarding testimonies of experiences of alienation, while other criticism targets contingent features of Deep Self views that ought to be abandoned. To aid in this project, I provide original (...) naturalistic analyses of “Self” and “internality” that replace the view’s metaphorical language with common-sensical concepts that make clear their usefulness. (shrink)

In Almost Over: Aging, Dying, Dead, Frances Kamm seeks to make sense of people’s widely variant choices about which lives they would choose to continue living. She does this by defending the Prudential Prerogative, which, in analogy to the Moral Prerogative, holds that in a fairly wide range of conditions we are under no intrapersonal rational obligation to choose either to die or to live on. I argue against Kamm's case for the Prudential Prerogative in favor of Life Holism, the (...) view that you ought to live the life that would be best for you as an individual when each potential life is considered as a whole. I argue that the features of the Moral Prerogative that make it an attractive principle do not transfer to the Prudential Prerogative, and that Life Holism can better account for the perspectival and non-summative features of the normative phenomena Kamm wants to capture while retaining a tight connection between reasons and goodness. (shrink)

The moral responsibility literature frequently relies on both explicit and implicit claims about “ideal” or “normal” agency that import unjustified normative assumptions into our theorizing. In doing so, it both fails to reckon with and misconstrues the reality of agential diversity. In this article I diagnose the root of this problem, which I trace back to the confluence of two factors: the search for fundamental agential capacities, and systemic discrimination toward psychological variance. I then preview three socially and politically important (...) domains of inquiry that have been obscured by this paradigm as a way of motivating the need for and value of applying a neurodiversity perspective to moral responsibility and the ethics of blame. (shrink)

ForewordThe motivation for the publication of this lecture is my firm belief that any word that can even slightly clarify and advance the powerful and fruitful idea of the transmutation of species is of value.First, I wish to put an end to the futile discussions which go nowhere since they ignore accumulated knowledge and always start from scratch. I want to proclaim that at the core of the Darwinian theory, regardless of its merit as a whole, lies the transmutation hypothesis, (...) which is nowadays the only legitimate scientific hypothesis on the origin of organic forms. Therefore, futurescientificdiscussions should focus on Darwinian theory alone, as its foundation is irrefutable.This lecture has been printed completely unchanged and unavoidable necessary additions have been transferred to footnotes. This article was already completed when Moritz Wagner'sThe Darwinian theory and the migration law of organism1*was published. Wagner attempts to diminish the role of natural selection in Darwin's theory and I challenge this view in the appendix, which also addresses the factors Wagner emphasized as influencing speciation.Freiburg im Breisgau, August 2, 1868August Weismann. (shrink)

John Martin Fischer’s Death, Immortality, and Meaning in Life puts forth a view that individual experiences could provide us with sources of endless fascination, motivation, and value if only we could live forever to continue to enjoy them. In this article I advocate for more caution about embracing this picture by pointing to three points of tension in Fischer's book. First, I argue that taking meaningfulness in life to be holistic is not compatible with the view immortal lives would be (...) recognizably humanlike. Next, I interrogate Fischer’s claim that that worries about boredom in immortal lives are predicated on the false view that our pursuits are compelling to us because we value them instrumentally, showing that he relies on a more controversial view of the value of our pursuits. Finally, I argue that Fischer’s naturalistic reinterpretation of the value of Near-Death experiences falls somewhat short of capturing their poignancy. Given Fischer’s seeming acknowledgment that what we get from an experience is sometimes ineffable, I argue that he ought to be less skeptical that a genuine Near-Death Experience would give the person experiencing it some (defeasible) evidence of the supernatural. (shrink)

Metaphysical grounding is often presented as a relation of directed dependence analogous to causation. The relationship between causation, properties, and laws of nature is hotly debated. I ask: what is the relationship between grounding, properties, and laws of metaphysics? I begin by considering the grounding analogue of Humean quidditism. Finding it implausible, I turn to the primitive-laws account of grounding, recently defended by Jonathan Schaffer and others. I argue this view is also unsatisfactory. I then present several possible dispositionalist-like accounts (...) and characterize the notion of a power to ground. I argue for three important conclusions: (i) each property essentially confers grounding powers; (ii) non-fundamental properties can be defined structurally in a particular sense, elucidating the claim that they are ‘nothing over and above’ the fundamental; and (iii) fundamental properties play a central role in grounding the grounding facts. Finally, it is significant that, combined with a causal powers-account of causal explanation, the door is open to a unified account of the metaphysics of causation and grounding: both flow from the natures of fundamental properties. (shrink)

I argue in favor of the Minimal Approval account, an original account of an agent’s moral responsibility for her actions, understood as the conditions that must be met so that an agent’s actions speak for her such that she can appropriately be blamed on their basis. My account shares a general theoretical orientation with Deep Self views, but diverges in several respects. I argue that Deep Self views tend to seriously over-generate exemptions, such that agents are exempt from responsibility even (...) from ordinary weak-willed actions. Accordingly, much of my focus is on giving a more nuanced, and in certain senses narrower, explanation of genuine exemption cases. While I address the advantages the Minimal Approval account has over competing accounts throughout these chapters, the account also aims to provide an empirically informed response to a certain sort of skeptical worry about how it could be the case that anyone is ever responsible for what they do at all. One commonplace thought is that when agents’ behaviors are due to compulsion their “brains make them do it.” But, in a literal sense, it might seem that our brains make all of us do everything that we do. In this dissertation I head off this worry by directly addressing both what the difference is, and what it should mean for our practices. (shrink)

Metaphysical grounding is often presented as a relation of directed dependence analogous to causation. The relationship between causation, properties, and laws of nature is hotly debated. I ask: what is the relationship between grounding, properties, and laws of metaphysics? I begin by considering the grounding analogue of Humean quidditism. Finding it implausible, I turn to the primitive-laws account of grounding, recently defended by Jonathan Schaffer and others. I argue this view is also unsatisfactory. I then present several possible dispositionalist-like accounts (...) and characterize the notion of a power to ground. I argue for three important conclusions: (i) each property essentially confers grounding powers; (ii) non-fundamental properties can be defined structurally in a particular sense, elucidating the claim that they are ‘nothing over and above’ the fundamental; and (iii) fundamental properties play a central role in grounding the grounding facts. Finally, it is significant that, combined with a causal powers-account of causal explanation, the door is open to a unified account of the metaphysics of causation and grounding: both flow from the natures of fundamental properties. (shrink)

Network concepts are omnipresent in contemporary diagnoses, management practices, social science methods and theories. Instigating a critical analysis of network concepts, this article explores the sources and relevance of networks in Foucault’s social theory. I argue that via Foucault we can trace network concepts back to cybernetics, a research programme that initiated a shift from ‘being’ to ‘doing’ and developed a new theory of regulation based on connectivity and codes, communication and circulation. This insight contributes to two debates: Firstly, it (...) highlights a neglected influence on Foucault’s theory that travelled from cybernetics via structuralism and Canguilhem into his concept of power. Secondly, it suggests that network society and governance are neither a product of neoliberalism nor of technological artefacts, such as the Internet. They rather resulted from a distinct tradition of cybernetically inspired theories and practices. (shrink)

Preview: /Review: Andrea J. Pitts and Mark William Westmoreland, eds. Beyond Bergson: Examining Race and Colonialism Through the Writings of Henri Bergson, 255 pages./ Among Bergson’s contributions to philosophical and empirical investigations; such as those centered on freedom, memory, and evolution; exists in the form of his last book, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. It is interesting because, as many readers of Bergson have remarked, it does not seem to fit well, primarily in method, with his other endeavors (...) in the pursuit of philosophical exploration and elaboration. Having been mentored by a philosopher who holds this position, I have long shied away from the text that represents Bergson’s last concerted philosophical effort of inquiry. Meanwhile, having been intrigued by the possibility of a more just world and compelled by a desire to serve such an end, I was interested in envisioning what a Bergsonian philosophy of social justice, revolution, or morality would contain. Early on in my readings of Bergson, I felt the seeming applicability of Bergson’s method of intuition to moral and social questions. Over the years, I have devoted significant time to thinking through durational investigations of intensity to problems of social justice. While I have made some inroads to accomplishing this goal, I feel the journey has just begun for me. It was in this context that I was excited at the prospect of this book, and it is this book that has helped me to appreciate some of the ways that Bergson’s philosophy could be adapted to thinking through moral and social questions. To be clear, much work has been done in the way of expounding political or moral philosophies in which Bergson’s thought might be interpreted as a prelude. My reluctance to embrace Two Sources has been a self-imposed hindrance to my engaging in those extra-Bergsonian works for fear of running against the current of Bergson’s earlier texts. My reticence is intended to be taken as neither a slight of Bergson’s Two Sources nor a discounting of those who find inspiration in that work. (shrink)

This paper argues that the question, ‘where are virtues?’ demands a response from virtue theorists. Despite the polarizing nature of debates about the relevance of empirical work in psychology for virtue theory, I first show that there is widespread agreement about the underlying structure of virtue. Namely, that virtues are comprised of cognitive and affective processes. Next, I show that there are well-developed arguments that cognitive processes can extend beyond the agent. Then, I show that there are similarly well-developed arguments (...) that affective processes can extend beyond the agent. I then introduce three cases to establish that these cognitive and affective processes are relevantly similar to the cognitive and affective processes countenanced by plausible theories of virtue. Finally, I conclude that virtue theorists must abandon default internalism, the view that the cognitive and affective processes comprising virtues are internal to the agent. (shrink)

This paper aims to expand the range of empirical work relevant to the extended cognition debates. First, I trace the historical development of the person-situation debate in social and personality psychology and the extended cognition debate in the philosophy of mind. Next, I highlight some instructive similarities between the two and consider possible objections to my comparison. I then argue that the resolution of the person-situation debate in terms of interactionism lends support for an analogously interactionist conception of extended cognition. (...) I argue that this interactionism might necessitate a shift away from the dominant agent-artifact paradigm toward an agent–agent paradigm. If this is right, then social and personality psychology—the discipline(s) that developed from the person-situation debate—opens a whole new range of empirical considerations for extended cognition theorists which align with Clark & Chalmers original vision of agents themselves as spread into the world. (shrink)

In 1916 John Dewey expressed a worry that American philosophy would be relegated to “chewing a historic cud long since reduced to a woody fibre, or an apologetics for lost causes (lost to natural science).”1 In this paper, I will attempt to contribute to a growing body of literature within the classical American philosophical tradition that seeks to avoid this fate by engaging Dewey’s thought with debates in contemporary philosophy of mind.2 To date, the vast majority of this work has (...) centered around Dewey’s notion of embodiment and its relation to the thesis of the embodied mind. In this paper I will evaluate the degree to which the embodied mind thesis (henceforth “EMT”) provides the proper framework for .. (shrink)

This paper argues that the activist, feminist and pragmatist Jane Addams was an experimental philosopher. To defend this claim, I argue for capacious notions of both philosophical pragmatism and experimental philosophy. I begin in Section 2 with a new defence of Rose and Danks’ [‘In Defense of a Broad Conception of Experimental Philosophy’. Metaphilosophy 44, no. 4 : 512–32] argument in favour of a broad conception of experimental philosophy. Koopman [‘Pragmatist Resources for Experimental Philosophy: Inquiry in Place of Intuition’. Journal (...) of Speculative Philosophy 26, no. 1 : 1–24] argues that many twentieth-century American pragmatists can make important contributions to contemporary experimental philosophy. In Section 3, I argue that while this may be true, it is also true that under the broad conception, many of the pragmatists just were experimental philosophers. In Section 4, I argue that as a pragmatist philosopher in her own right, Jane... (shrink)

The integration of ethical analysis in Health Technology Assessment (HTA) has proven difficult to implement even though it is explicitly recognized as an important component of such assessments in HTA literature. When compared to the standardized scientific method for systematic reviews in HTA, the diversity of ethical analysis has been characterized as a fundamental barrier to the integration of ethics. The present paper aims to identify the theoretical and practical differences between the approaches underpinning ethical analysis in HTA and clarify (...) the reasons for such diversity. Our systematic review of HTA literature pertaining to the barriers to the integration of ethics in HTA identified nine ethical approaches: Principlism, Casuistry, Coherence Analysis, Wide Reflective Equilibrium, Axiology, the Socratic approach, the Triangular model, Constructive Technology Assessment and Social Shaping of Technology. Citations pertaining to each approach were extracted and categorized according to three constitutive components of ethical argumentation established in a previous research evaluating nanotechnologies: i) the disciplinary foundation that grounds the validity of the ethical evaluation, ii) the characteristics of such evaluation, iii) the operational process involved in applying it to a particular case (i.e., its practical reasoning). This comparison shows that, 1) the difference between these approaches rests primarily on their disciplinary foundation (rooted in philosophy, philosophy/theology, or sociology), 2) their complexity can be observed in the distinct characteristics of ethical evaluation deriving from their differing disciplinary foundation, and 3) although four different types of operationalization procedure were identified, little information was available in regards to the practical reasoning associated with these approaches. (shrink)

Abstract: While pragmatism and the so-called 4E program may form a united front against methodological individualism, classical cognitivism, traditional internalism, and the like, the 4E approach is not without its own internal tensions. One such tension, between Embodied and Extended, is brought to light by Clark (2008), who argues in favor of the latter. Dempsey and Shani (2013) reply that Clark’s functionalism undercuts what should be a more fundamental commitment to Embodied. With respect to this tension, Gallagher (2014) claims that (...) “there may be resources in pragmatism that can help to adjudicate some of the current debate and to develop a more integrated perspective” (Gallagher 2014, 110). In this paper, I assess Gallagher’s strategy and offer a critical perspective on the use of Deweyan pragmatism to resolve these tensions in the 4E program. (shrink)

Jonathan Edwards and Ralph Waldo Emerson remain central voices in North American spiritual traditions. This article is an attempt to contextualize a major vein of the north American theological and spiritual tradition concerning the intersection of aesthetics and the human experience of God. As will be argued below, both Edwards and Emerson were deeply involved in these conversations and to a large extent offer novel approaches to the tensions between the individual and community as it relates to the experience of (...) God. To that end, this essay begins with an analysis of Edwards's view of religious experience and its normative relation to human experience as a whole. I will argue that... (shrink)

The 18th century was a wealth of knowledge, exploration and rapidly growing technology and expanding record-keeping made possible by advances in the printing press. In its determination to preserve the century of revolution, Gale initiated a revolution of its own: digitization of epic proportions to preserve these invaluable works in the largest archive of its kind. Now for the first time these high-quality digital copies of original 18th century manuscripts are available in print, making them highly accessible to libraries, undergraduate (...) students, and independent scholars. The Age of Enlightenment profoundly enriched religious and philosophical understanding and continues to influence present-day thinking. Works collected here include masterpieces by David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, as well as religious sermons and moral debates on the issues of the day, such as the slave trade. The Age of Reason saw conflict between Protestantism and Catholicism transformed into one between faith and logic -- a debate that continues in the twenty-first century. ++++ The below data was compiled from various identification fields in the bibliographic record of this title. This data is provided as an additional tool in helping to insure edition identification: ++++ British Library T112862 Pp.233/234 misnumbered 133/134. London: printed, and sold by J. Downes, 1796. [4],134[i.e.234]p.; 8°. (shrink)

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In Norway, priority for health interventions is assigned on the basis of three official criteria: health benefit, resources, and severity. Responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have mainly happened through intersectoral public health efforts such as lockdowns, quarantines, information campaigns, social distancing and, more recently, vaccine distribution. The aim of this article is to evaluate potential priority setting criteria for public health interventions. We argue in favour of the following three criteria for public health priority setting: benefit, resources and improving the (...) well-being of the worse off. We argue that benefits and priority to the worse off may reasonably be understood in terms of individual well-being, rather than only health, for public health priority setting. We argue that lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic support our conclusions. Keywords: COVID-19, Prioritarianism, Priority Setting, Public Health, Severity. (shrink)

Two popular models of trustworthiness have garnered support over the years. One has postulated three aspects of trustworthiness as state-based antecedents to trust. Another has been interpreted to comprise two aspects of trustworthiness. Empirical data shows support for both models, and debate remains as to the theoretical and practical reasons researchers may adopt one model over the other. The present research aimed to consider this debate by investigating the factor structure of trustworthiness. Taking items from two scales commonly employed to (...) assess trustworthiness, we leveraged structural equation modeling to explore which theoretical model is supported by the data in an organizational trust context. We considered an array of first-order, second-order, and bifactor models. The best-fitting model was a bifactor model comprising one general trustworthiness factor and ability, benevolence, and integrity grouping factors. This model was determined to be essentially unidimensional, though this is qualified by the finding that the grouping variables accounted for significant variance with for several organizational outcome criteria. These results suggest that respondents typically employ a general factor when responding to items assessing trustworthiness, and researchers may be better served treating the construct as unidimensional or engaging in scale parceling of their models to reflect this response tendency more accurately. However, the substantial variance accounted by the grouping variables in hierarchical regression suggest there may be contexts in which it would be acceptable to consider the theoretical factors of ability, benevolence, and integrity independent of general trustworthiness. (shrink)

In Germany a number of dictionaries of foreign words as lexemes were created. The author cites about 460 dictionaries of foreign borrowings from the period 1800–2007. Dictionaries of borrowings can be divided into three categories: dictionaries of foreign words that do not have the objective of eliminating borrowed words, but describe them in a neutral manner, Germanising dictionaries whose main purpose is to eliminate the use of foreign words and replace them with native words. There are suggested word replacements for (...) foreign lexemes, and the lexeme citation is devoid of grammatical and phonetic information, Germanising and explanatory dictionaries: mixed form: here there is a description of the foreign code, but also proposals to replace some borrowings with German equivalents. In this latter category we include the dictionary which is the subject of this article; that of Johann Christian August Heyse. (shrink)

In this chapter, we outline the interdisciplinary contributions that philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience have provided in the understanding of the self and identity, focusing on one specific line of burgeoning research: the importance of morality to perceptions of self and identity. Of course, this rather limited focus will exclude much of what psychologists and neuroscientists take to be important to the study of self and identity (that plethora of self-hyphenated terms seen in psychology and neuroscience: self-regulation, self-esteem, self-knowledge, self-concept, self-perception, (...) and more). We will likewise not engage with many canonical philosophical treatments of self and identity. But we will lay out a body of research that brings together classic themes in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience to raise empirically tractable philosophical questions, and philosophically rigorous empirical questions about self and identity. More specifically, in section 4.2, we will review some recent research that has treated traditional philosophical questions about self and identity as empirical questions. Within this body of work, we will be primarily concerned with the finding that morality (more so than memory) is perceived to be at the core of self and identity. Then, in section 4.3, we raise and respond to a variety of questions and criticisms: first, about the operationalization of identity concepts in the empirical literature; second, about the generalizability of the moral self effect; third, about the direction of change; fourth, about connections with recent work in neuroscience; and fifth, about the target of evaluation. Finally, in section 4.4, we consider a variety of implications and applications of this work on the moral self. Throughout, we aim to highlight connections between classical themes in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience, while also suggesting new directions for interdisciplinary collaboration. (shrink)

August Weismann is famous for having argued against the inheritance of acquired characters. However, an analysis of his work indicates that Weismann always held that changes in external conditions, acting during development, were the necessary causes of variation in the hereditary material. For much of his career he held that acquired germ-plasm variation was inherited. An irony, which is in tension with much of the standard twentieth-century history of biology, thus exists – Weismann was not a Weismannian. I distinguish (...) three claims regarding the germ-plasm: (1) its continuity, (2) its morphological sequestration, and (3) its variational sequestration. With respect to changes in Weismann’s views on the cause of variation, I divide his career into four stages. For each stage I analyze his beliefs on the relative importance of changes in external conditions and sexual reproduction as causes of variation in the hereditary material. Weismann believed, and Weismannism denies, that variation, heredity, and development were deeply intertwined processes. This article is part of a larger project comparing commitments regarding variation during the latter half of the nineteenth century. (shrink)